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1From 1875 to January 1, 1879 the U.S. was still on the floating Greenback Standard. However the 
Resumption Act of 1875 anchored expectations on the announced return to gold parity and the dollar pound 
exchange rate was very close to parity (Bordo, Erceg and Levin, 2007). 
2Bordo, Rappoport and Schwartz ( 992) provide evidence doubting the presence of credit rationing in the 
National Banking era. They argue that it is difficult to distinguish credit shocks  from shocks to the money 

















































































































































































































                                                 
3According to Owens and Schreft (1993) the 1973-74 episode was not a true credit crunch which they 





































































































                                                 
4 For 1914 quarter 3, the markets were closed, and we entered a judgmental value of 1% for the spread.  As 
this was a time of turmoil in the markets, it is not an innocuous assumption. 
5 Quarterly data is a linear interpolation from the annual data in Table A-XIX in Kendrick (1961), re-
indexed.  TFP since then is calculated using log(TFP)=log(Y)-0.3log(K)-0.7log(L), with Y the BLS 
measure of “Nonfarm Business Sector: Output,” L is “Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons,” 
and K is “Net Capital Stock of Private Fixed Nonresidential Assets” from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, linearly interpolated to obtain a quarterly series.  See Levy and Chen (1994) or Cooley and 
Prescott (1995) for comparisons of construction techniques. 
14 
 or min for two quarters on either side, that is,    is a cyclical peak if 
















of the cycle.  Denote the periods that series     spends in an expansion as      1  
and the time spent in contraction as      0 .  Then the concordance     between 
series x and series y is defined as 
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 Tables  2  and  3  report  the  mean  amplitude  and  duration  of  cycles  for  the 
1875:I‐1918:IV period, and tables 4 and 5 report the amplitude and durations for 












trough  duration  of  8.25  quarters,  and  a  trough‐to‐peak  duration  of  nearly  10 
quarters, as well as showing noticeably longer maximum cycles.  Also note the 







  What  about  monetary  policy?  For  the  earlier  period,  we  use  two 
measures.  The first is Balke and Gordon’s measure of M2, taken as the year‐







                                                 
6 Total Factor Productivity also shows an asymmetric cycle, with mean peak-to-trough time for two periods 
of 5.1 and 5.2 quarters, with a trough-to-peak means of 8 and 16 quarters.  It shows a concordance with the 
NBER cycle of only 45% in the early period, but 82% for the later. 
17 
 Like the NBER cycle, it is rather asymmetric, and perhaps not surprisingly, with 
contractions  nearly  twice  as  long  as  expansions.  The  discount  rate,  our  other 
measure  of  policy,  exhibits  even  more  asymmetry,  with  mean  peak‐to‐trough 
duration  of  nine  quarters  and  mean  trough‐to‐peak  duration  of  over  twenty.  
(again note that a “contraction” in the money supply probably corresponds to an 
“expansion”  in  the  discount  rate.).  Overall  it  is  noticeably  longer  than  the 
business cycle. 







time  of  monetary  tightening,  with  all  eleven  NBER  recessions  occurring  in  a 








countercyclically  with  M2.  For  the  19th  century,  we  find  evidence  for  the 
importance  of  credit  in  that  the  Baa  spread  moves  countercylically  to  the 
business  cycle:  increasing  risk  spreads  are  associated  with  recessions.  The 
evidence  for  money  is  mixed,  with  the  discount  rate  showing  procyclical 
concordance, but we cannot reject independence for the log difference of M2. 









are  somehow  associated  with  different  amplitudes  of  contractions  can  be 
addressed in several ways.  Following Claessens, Kose and Terrones, Tables 8 
and  9  report  regressions  of  recession  amplitude  against  changes  in  the  risk 








positive  (and  often  significant)  coefficient  on  the  change  in  the  stock  index 






















risk‐spread‐money‐growth  interaction  is  included.  TFP  growth  tends  to  be 
negatively associated with recessions.  
  Both  the  historical  narrative  and  the  empirical  results  suggest  that  a 
confluence  of  financial  shocks—in  risk  spreads,  assets  prices  and  money 
supply—will  exacerbate  a  contraction,  or  at  least  be  associated  with  deeper 
contractions.  A closer look that the deeper recessions in our sample bears this 







possible  exception  of  the  combined  1980‐1981  drop).  1945  stands  out  as  an 
anomaly,  but  the  other  three  stand  out  as  having  the  three  largest  drops 
percentage drops in the money supply and stock prices, and two of the three 
largest  increases  in  the  risk  spread.  Contemporary  accounts  of  the  1920 
contraction  do  not  mention  a  credit  crunch  in  line  with  the  only  moderate 
increase in the risk spread in that contraction.  While the 1929 contraction also 


















































 April,  2009,  the  difference  between  the  yield  on  Baa  bonds  and  long‐term 
Treasuries has moved up 342 basis points, a larger increase than seen in the 1929 













































































































































Kendrick, J.W., 1961.  Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton University 
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 TABLE 1:Descriptive Data 1873-2008 






























no Bank  of 
England 
tightens 
? International  Financial 
Crisis; real estate bust 
in Germany, Austria; 
Railroad scandal stock 
market crisis and 
serious recession 
focused on railroads. 
Panic ends with 
suspension of 
convertibility. 
2  March 1882  June 1884  February 
1884 
no no  yes
1 Minor  panic 
consequent upon 
failure of Grant and 
Ward, attenuated by 
NY clearing house. 
3  March 1887  no  no  no  no  no  Minor recession 




no Bank  of 
England 
tightens 
no  Baring crisis in 
London caused by 
Argentine defaults. 
Bank of England 
tightening leads to 
sudden stop, minor 
banking panic 




May 1893  May 1893  no  Silver risk  yes
1  Major U.S. banking 
panic related to fears 
U.S. would be found 
off gold standard after 
passage of Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act. 








no no  Silver  risk  no Gorton(1987) 
identifies a banking 
panic but Sprague and 
Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) do 
not. Silver risk induced 
run on U.S. Treasury 
gold reserves 














































1  Major recession and 


















no  no  no  Outbreak of World 
War I 
12  August 1918  no  Fall 1917  no  no  no  Mild recession, 
Mishkin and 
White(2002) attribute 
stock market crisis to 
rising interest rates 




no Fall  1920  no yes no Major  recession 
induced by Fed tight 
money to roll back 
wartime inflation. 
14  May 1923  no  no  no  yes  no  Minor recession. Fed 
followed policy of 
moderate 
restraint(Friedman 
and Schwartz 1963. 




no no  no




and Schwartz 1963. 
p.288) 











5 Great  contraction. 
Tight Fed policy 1928-
29 to stem stock 
market speculation for 
Banking crises. 
Contraction in net 
worth, debt deflation, 
bank capital crunch. 
17 May  1937  no  February 
1937 May 
1940 
no yes  yes
6  Major recession. Fed 
doubles reserve 
requirements in 1936, 
Contraction in net 






no  no  no  End of World War II. 
Sharp decreases in 
government 
expenditures. 
Adjustment from war 
to peace. 
30 


























no no  no  yes
7 no  Fed tightens to offset 
post war inflation. 
20  July 1953  no  no  no  yes  yes
8  Mild recession. 
Moderate tightening 
reflecting Fed concern 
of inflation. Bond crisis 
raises rates. 
21  August 1957  no  no  no  yes
9 yes
10  Significant recession 
induced by Fed 
tightening. Evidence 
of credit rationing. 
22  April 1960  no  Spring 
1902
11 
no yes  yes
12  Mild recession 
induced by Fed 
tightening. 
Disintermediation as 
market rates pierced 
Regulation Q. ceilings 
leads to reduced bank 
lending. 




"Credit crunch" of 
1966 background of 
Fed tightening 
monetary policy end of 
1965. Fed bank 
regulators urged 
restraint on bank 
lending. 
Disintermediation 





14 May  1970  no yes
15 yes
16  Mild recession. Fed 
tightening and 
jawboning by Fed and 
government to restrain 
lending. 
Disintermediation as 
market rates exceed 




17  November 
1973
18 
no yes  yes
19  Fed tightening. OPEC 
shock. Significant 
recession. Arthur 
Burns May 1974 urges 
banks to allocate 
credit through non 
price rationing. 
31 





























22  Significant Fed 
tightening begins 
October 1979 (Volcker 
shock). March 1980 





lifted July 1980. 
26  July 1981  no
23 no  no  yes  no
24  Tight Fed policy 
induces serious 
recession. 





27  Fed tightening. Gulf 
war. Mild recession. 
Evidence of non price 
credit rationing and a 
capital crunch. 
28  March 2001  no  Spring 
2001 
no yes no  Fed restraint leads to 







30 yes  Fed tightening 
beginning in June 
2004 may have 
helped trigger a real 
estate bust, Lehman 
Brothers failure, credit 
crunch, stock market 
slide, and severe 
recession. 
Endnotes 
1 Calomiris and Hubbard(1989) Citing Sprague and others. 
2 Gorton(1987). 
3 Florida land bust, White(2008). 
4 White(2008).
 
5 Bernanke(1983), Calomiris and Mason(2003), Calomiris and Wilson(2004). 
6 Bernanke(1983), Calomiris and Wilson(2004). 
7 Romer and Romer(1989) pick October 1947 as the start of Fed tightening. 
8 Wojnilower(1992) states that bank lending was impaired by the collapse in Treasury bond 
prices. 
9 Romer and Romer(1989) date tightening as beginning September 1955. 
10 Wojnilower(1980, 1982, 1992), Eckstein and Sinai(1985) discuss credit rationing as leading to 
the 1957-58 recession. 
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 11 Real stock prices decline by 29% January 1966 to October 1966(Bordo, Dueker and Wheelock 
2008). 
12 According to Wojnilower(1980, 1992), Fed tightening pushed T-bill rates above the Regulation 
Q ceiling leading to  disintermediation. 
13 Wojnilower(1980), Owens and Schreft(1993). 
14 Penn Central collapse in July 1970. The Fed averted a crisis by backstopping the money center 
banks' support of the commercial paper market.
 
15 Romer and Romer(1989) date Fed tightening as beginning in December 1968. 
16 Owens and Schreft(1993). 
17 Failures of Franklin National Bank October 1974 and Germany's Herstatt Bank June 1974. 
18 Romer and Romer(1989) date monetary tightening as beginning in April 1974. 
19 Owens and Schreft(1993). 
20 Real stock prices decline by 20%, November 1980 to July 1982(Bordo, Dueker and Wheelock 
2008). 
21 Shiller(2005) figure 2.1 shows a 13% decline in real house prices 1979-1993. 
22 Owens and Schreft(1993).
 
23 Failures of Continental Illinois and Penn Square banks in 1984. Also Savings and Loan crisis in 
1984. 
24 Owens and Schreft(1993). 
25 Shiller(2005) figure 2.1 shows a 13% decline in real house prices 1989-1993. 
26 Romer and Romer(1989) give December 1988 as the beginning of tight policy. 
27 Bernanke and Lown(1991) provide evidence of a capital crunch in New England. Bonds 
reduced lending to replenish their capital to meet regulatory standard. Owens and 
Schreft(1993) document non price credit rationing in the real estate sector. 
  
          
28 The Standard and Poor stock price index declined 55%. July 2007 to March 2009. 
29 The Case and Shiller real home price index declined 33% from December 2006 to October 
2008.
 





Banking Crises: Bordo(1986), Friedman and Schwartz(1963), Gorton(1987). 
 
Stock Market Crashes: Bordo(1985), Bordo, Dueker and Wheelock(2008), Friedman and 
Schwartz(1963), Mishkin and White(2002), Sprague(1910) 
 
Real Estate Busts: Shiller(2005), White(2008). 
 
Tight Monetary Policy: Friedman and Schwartz(1963), Meltzer(2004), Romer and Romer(1989). 
 
Credit Crunch: Bernanke(1985), Bernanke and Lown(1991), Calomiris and Hubbard(1987), 
Calomiris and Mason(2003), Calomiris and Wilson(2004), Eckstein and Sinai(1985), Owens and 






P-T %  Trough-peak  T-P % 
RGNP (NBER 
cycles) 
-11.13 -7.8%  36.37  34.1% 
Rail Road Spread  -0.28   0.27   
CP  -2.63   2.51   
M2 growth  10.4%   12.1%   







th   Peak-Trough Trough-peak 


































Amplitude Peak-Trough  P-T %  Trough-peak  T-P % 
RGNP (NBER 
cycles) 
-28.69 -5.9% 238.52 29.0% 
Baa Spread  -1.18   1.14   
Discount Rate  -2.18   2.18   
M2 growth  -2.9%   3.1%   


















Baa Spread  mean 11.1




















































M2 (log difference)      1  50.3 
48.0 
35.4% 
NBER cycle        1 
Table 6: Concordances, expected concordances, and probability of independence 
(regression method) for 20
th century series: 1920:1 to 2007:4, quarterly, M2 is  annual log 
difference, using data from 1919:1 calculated from Balke-Gordon, spliced with Board of 
Governors M2 data. 
Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield (% p.a.) less Long-Term Treasury 
Composite, Over 10 Years (% p.a.) 































   1  39.2 
49.7 
6.4% 
M2 (log difference)        1 
Real GNP        67.0 
54.1% 
0.000% 
Table 7: same as above, for 19





 Table 8 NBER 19 Recession Amplitude, 19
th Century. 
Recession amplitude (Peak-trough Real GNP as a fraction of Peak RGNP) for NBER 
contractions, regressed against the Peak-Trough change in other variables.  Money supply and 
Stock index are also measured as fractional changes. 
Dependent Variable:  RNGP 
Data is for the NBER recessions starting in 1893,1895,1899,1902,1907,1910, and 1913. 
With Heteroscedasticity-Consistent (Eicker-White) Standard Errors 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Independent 
Variables  1 2  3 4 
















Commercial Paper  0.624*** 
(5.65)     0.616*** 
(5.69) 








M2 growth                       0.044 
(5.43) 
0.053*** 






(0.47)    0.349 
(0.516) 
Interaction 1      0.317 
(0.632)   
Interaction 2        -1.61 
(-0.41) 
Observations 8  8  8  8 
R
2 0.887  0.791  0.800  0.888 
R-bar
2  0.736 0.513  0.301 0.609 
* 10% significance level 
**  5% significance level 




 TABLE 9 NBER 20 Recession Amplitude, 20
th century. 
Recession amplitude (Peak-trough Real GNP as a fraction of Peak RGNP) for NBER 
contractions, regressed against the Peak-Trough change in other variables.  Money supply and 
Stock index are also measured as fractional changes. 
Dependent Variable:  RNGP 
Data is for the NBER recessions starting in 1920, 1923,1926,1929, 1937, 1945, 1948, 1953, 
1957, 1960, 1969, 1973, 1980, 1981, 1990, 2001.  
Dependent Variable:  RNGP 
With Heteroscedasticity-Consistent (Eicker-White) Standard Errors 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Independent 
Variables  1 2  3 4 
















Discount Rate  -0.011 
(-1.36)     -0.033** 
(-2.56) 








M2 growth    0.590*** 
(4.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.001)   








Interaction 1      -0.4738** 
(-2.01)   
Interaction 2        -0.029** 
(-2.41) 
Observations 16  16  16  16 
R
2 0.719  0.752  0.8534  0.803 
R-bar
2  0.616 0.662  0.779 0.705 
* 10% significance level 
**  5% significance level 




 TABLE 10: PAGAN 19 Recession Amplitude associated with cycles in other variables. 
This shows the results of regression of RGNP percent amplitude in an NBER contraction (P-T) 
against the change other variables over their individual Harding-Pagan cycle.  
Dependent Variable:  RNGP 
For the recessions of the 19
th century. 
With Heteroscedasticity-Consistent (Eicker-White) Standard Errors 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Independent 
Variables  1 2  3  4 
















Commercial Paper  0.029* 
(1.78)     -0.202*** 
(5.95) 








M2 growth    -0.137 
(-0.516) 
-1.28 
(-0.95)   








Interaction 1      3.74 
(0.86)   
Interaction 2        1.44*** 
(7.39) 
Observations 7  7  7  7 
R
2 0.701  0.648  0.663  0.941 
R-bar
2  0.104 -0.05  -1.0  0.649 
* 10% significance level 
**  5% significance level 




 Table 11: PAGAN 20 Recession Amplitude associated with cycles in other variables. 
This shows the results of regression of RGNP percent amplitude in an NBER contraction (P-T) 
against the change other variables over their individual Harding-Pagan cycle.  
 
Dependent Variable:  RNGP 
With Heteroscedasticity-Consistent (Eicker-White) Standard Errors 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Independent 
Variables  1 2  3 4 
















Discount Rate  -0.011* 
(-1.74)     0.021 
(1.19) 








M2 growth    0.096 
(0.45) 
0.094* 
(1.77)   








Interaction 1      0.146*** 
(22.41)   
Interaction 2        -0.015 
(-1.58) 
Observations 15  15  15  15 
R
2 0.297  0.192  0.952  0.403 
R-bar
2  0.015 -0.131  0.924  0.071 
* 10% significance level 
**  5% significance level 











credit M2  Stock 
With  crunch  10.4% 14.8% 15.2% 
Without  crunch  3.8% 2.9% 2.8% 





credit M2  Stock 
With  crunch  7.1% 6.9% 5.4% 
Without crunch  0.1%  -0.7%  0.8% 
  t-statistic  1.83** 3.12** 0.94 
t-tests for equal mean with unequal variances.  
*significant at 10% level 
**significant at 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
 -
1
5
-
1
0
-
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
1
8
7
5
1
8
L
o
g
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
l
o
a
n
s
M
2
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
B
a
l
k
e
 
&
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
8
0
1
8
8
5
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
5
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
5
1
9
1
0
1
9
1
5
R
e
a
l
 
G
N
P
 
G
o
r
d
o
n
,
 
N
B
E
R
,
 
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
R
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
B
o
a
r
d
,
 
F
D
I
C
,
 
F
r
i
e
d
m
a
n
 
&
 
S
c
h
w
a
r
t
z
,
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
’
s
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
8
7
5
1
8
8
0
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
M
a
c
a
u
l
P
e
r
c
e
1
8
8
5
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
5
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
5
1
9
1
0
1
9
1
5
1
9
2
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
5
0
.
5
0
0
.
7
5
1
.
0
0
1
.
2
5
1
.
5
0
a
y
,
 
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
R
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
B
o
a
r
d
 
o
f
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
s
n
t
R
a
i
l
r
o
a
d
 
b
o
n
d
 
s
p
r
e
a
d
 
(
r
i
g
h
t
 
s
c
a
l
e
)
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
p
a
p
e
r
 
r
a
t
e
 
(
l
e
f
t
 
s
c
a
l
e
)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
-
3
5
-
2
5
-
1
5
-
5
5
1
5
2
5
3
5
4
5
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
5
1
9
L
o
g
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
l
o
a
n
s
M
2
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
B
a
l
k
e
 
&
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
3
0
1
9
3
5
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
5
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
5
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
R
e
a
l
 
G
N
P
 
G
o
r
d
o
n
,
 
N
B
E
R
,
 
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
R
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
B
o
a
r
d
,
 
F
D
I
C
,
 
F
r
i
e
d
m
a
n
 
&
 
S
c
h
w
a
r
t
z
,
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
’
s
 
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
5
1
9
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
P
e
r
c
e
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
3
0
1
9
3
5
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
5
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
5
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
 
R
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
B
o
a
r
d
 
o
f
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
s
n
t
B
a
a
 
b
o
n
d
 
s
p
r
e
a
d
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
8
7
5
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
5
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
5
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
5
1
9
1
0
1
9
1
5
1
9
2
0
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
o
r
’
s
S
&
P
 
5
0
0
 
i
n
d
e
x
I
n
d
e
x
,
 
L
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
i
c
 
s
c
a
l
e
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
5
1
9
3
0
1
9
3
5
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
5
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
5
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
&
 
P
o
o
r
’
s
S
&
P
 
5
0
0
 
i
n
d
e
x
I
n
d
e
x
,
 
L
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
i
c
 
s
c
a
l
e
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
5
1
9
3
0
1
9
3
5
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
5
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
5
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
&
 
P
o
o
r
’
s
S
&
P
 
5
0
0
 
i
n
d
e
x
I
n
d
e
x
,
 
L
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
i
c
 
s
c
a
l
e
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1
2
0
1
4
0
1
6
0
1
8
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
8
9
1
1
9
0
1
1
9
1
1
1
9
2
1
1
9
3
1
1
9
4
1
1
9
5
1
1
9
6
1
1
9
7
1
1
9
8
1
1
9
9
1
2
0
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
S
h
i
l
l
e
r
R
e
a
l
 
H
P
I
I
n
d
e
x
0
1-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
0
.
2
0
B
L
S
 
D
a
t
a
R
G
N
P
 
v
s
.
 
R
R
 
S
p
r
e
a
d
 
(
1
8
0
0
s
)
R
G
N
P
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
R
R
 
s
p
r
e
a
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
9
3
0
7
1
3
-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
1
4
-
0
.
1
2
-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
0
8
-
0
.
0
6
-
0
.
0
4
-
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
6
B
L
S
 
D
a
t
a
M
2
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
R
G
N
P
 
v
s
.
 
M
2
 
(
1
8
0
0
s
)
R
G
N
P
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
9
3
0
7
1
3
-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
-
0
.
2
0
-
0
.
1
2
-
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
4
0
.
1
2
0
.
B
L
S
 
D
a
t
a
R
G
N
P
 
v
s
.
 
C
P
 
(
1
8
0
0
s
)
C
P
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
R
G
N
P
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
2
0
0
.
2
8
9
3
0
7
1
3
-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
4
0
.
1
2
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
8
B
L
S
 
D
a
t
a
S
t
o
c
k
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
-
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
R
G
N
P
 
v
s
.
 
S
t
o
c
k
s
 
(
1
8
0
0
s
)
R
G
N
P
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
9
3
0
7
1
3
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
2
 -
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
5
0
.
3
0
0
.
3
5
0
.
4
0
-
3
.
0
0
-
2
.
5
0
-
2
.
0
0
-
1
.
5
0
-
1
.
0
0
-
0
.
5
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
5
0
1
.
0
0
1
.
5
0
2
.
0
0
B
L
S
 
D
a
t
a
R
G
N
P
 
v
s
.
 
B
a
a
 
S
p
r
e
a
d
 
(
1
9
0
0
s
)
B
a
a
 
s
p
r
e
a
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
R
G
N
P
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
4
5
2
9
2
0
3
7
-
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
5
0
.
3
0
0
.
3
5
0
.
4
0
-
1
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
2
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
B
L
S
 
D
a
t
a
R
G
N
P
 
v
s
.
 
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
(
1
9
0
0
s
)
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
R
G
N
P
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
4
.
0
0
5
.
0
0
4
5
2
9
2
0
3
7
-
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
-
0
.
1
4
-
0
.
0
8
-
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
4
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
6
0
.
2
2
0
.
2
8
0
.
3
4
B
L
S
 
D
a
t
a
M
2
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
5
0
.
3
0
0
.
3
5
0
.
4
0
R
G
N
P
 
v
s
.
 
M
2
 
(
1
9
0
0
s
)
R
G
N
P
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
4
5
2
9
2
0
3
7
-
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
-
0
.
3
2
-
0
.
2
1
-
0
.
1
0
0
.
0
1
0
.
1
2
0
.
2
3
0
.
3
4
0
.
4
5
0
.
5
6
0
.
6
7
0
.
7
8
B
L
S
 
D
a
t
a
S
t
o
c
k
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
5
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
5
0
.
3
0
0
.
3
5
0
.
4
0
R
G
N
P
 
v
s
.
 
S
t
o
c
k
s
 
(
1
9
0
0
s
)
R
G
N
P
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
4
5
2
0
3
7
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
3
2
9
 